Personal Injury

CSR Ltd. v. Link, 925 S.W.2d 591 (Tex. 1996). (Specific Personal Jurisdiction; Mandamus Relief from Denial of a Special Appearance)
The court lacks specific personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant who sold a product out-of-state even though the seller knew that the buyer had operations in the state and the product may end up in the state. While foreseeability is a factor to consider, foreseeability alone does not amount to “purposeful availment.” Mandamus relief from a denial of a special appearance is appropriate when the potential for mass tort litigation makes ordinary appeal inadequate. The court will consider the most efficient use of state judicial resources and the risk for mass-tort actions against the defendant.

Diving, Inc. v. Doo-Pie, Inc., No. Civ. A. H-02-0293, 2002 WL 1163627 (S.D. Tex. May 30, 2002). (Specific Personal Jurisdiction; Venue)
Specific personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state company based solely on communications in connection with a contract may be proper where the company initiates some communications with the in-state party, and those communications assert the material misrepresentations which partially give rise to the cause of action. Jurisdiction may be proper even when the company has no offices, representatives, agents, property, or bank accounts, provides no labor, and manufactures no product within the state. When the work performed that gives rise to a cause of action is performed out of state, this does not defeat the deference for the plaintiff’s choice of venue when both parties have witnesses in both states, and have their books and records in their respective states.

Jeffries v. Thermo Fisher Scientific, No. Civ.A.1:07CV-192-JHM, 2009 WL 3807103 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 12, 2009) (mem. op.). (Wrongful Death; Statute of Limitations)
The statute of limitations on a wrongful death claim begins to run when the injury is or should have been discovered and not when the plaintiff learns the identity of the wrong doers.

Keene Corp. v. Belford, 881 S.W.2d 608 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1994, no writ). (Marketing Defect; Adverse Jury Finding)
A jury finding that no warning defect existed is not against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence when, although witnesses testify they never saw a warning label, plaintiff presents no affirmative evidence showing that no warning label existed.

Mansfield v. Fisher Scientific Co., LLC, No. 02-6163-TC, 2004 WL 816862 (D. Or. Mar. 04, 2004) (not designated for publication). (Causation)
If a plaintiff’s medical expert, after making a diagnosis, cannot unequivocally exclude other potential causes for plaintiff’s symptoms because there is no “test” to confirm the diagnosis, this does not inherently fail to show medical causation for the purpose of summary judgment.

Potharaju v. Jaising Mar., Ltd., 193 F. Supp. 2d 913 (E.D. Tex. 2002). (Negligence; Duty of Care)
The duty owed by a security company depends solely on the terms of the contractual agreement with its employer. Therefore, regardless of any duty owed by its employer, a security company does not owe invitees any duty unless its contract creates one. A security company does not assume any duty of care to invitees simply by providing security services for a property owner. A security officer must peform an affirmative act in order to assume a duty of care to an invitee.

Srite v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 870 S.W.2d 556 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ granted). (Zero Past Damages; Prejudgment Interest)
A jury's award of zero past damages is not against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence when: plaintiffs' testimony primarily expressed subjective indicia of their injuries; any objective evidence of plaintiffs' injuries is obtained from expert witness' testimony, and testimony by plaintiffs' experts, and defendants' experts conflict to the extent that none of the experts' testimony is conclusive. Prejudgment interest accrues “on wrongful death and non-death personal injury cases from a date six months after the occurrence of the incident giving rise to the cause of action.” In exposure cases, as it is not possible to determine which exposure caused the disease, the use of the last exposure date as the “incident giving rise to the cause of action” comports with this rationale. Reversed in Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Estate of Burt, 297 S.W.2d 765 (Tex. 1995).